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Big baths and CEO overconfidence
JOCHEN PIERK*
Erasmus University Rotterdam, Rotterdam, Netherlands
This paper empirically investigates the relationship between managerial overconfidence and
write-offs following CEO turnover. Incoming CEOs often engage in big bath accounting as
they dispose of poorly performing projects. Overconfident managers overestimate their
abilities and consequently have upwardly biased expectations concerning future firm
performance. I hypothesise that overconfident CEOs are less likely to engage in a big bath
following managerial change. The empirical results confirm this hypothesis by showing that
big baths at CEO turnover are significantly less frequent among overconfident CEOs.
Keywords: Big bath; earnings management; managerial characteristics; overconfidence
1. Introduction
Overconfidence is a particular form of a biased managerial view. Overconfident individuals over-
estimate their abilities and therefore have upwardly biased expectations related to their future per-
formance (e.g. Malmendier and Tate 2008, Ahmed and Duellman 2013). Overconfident managers
are more optimistic about their ability to turn around poorly performing projects and are therefore
more likely to overestimate the likelihood and magnitude of projects that go well and underesti-
mate the likelihood and magnitude of those that do not perform well. For example, Ahmed and
Duellman (2013) argue that they may erroneously perceive a project as profitable. In line with
these arguments, Ahmed and Duellman (2013) show that overconfident managers are generally
less conservative as they tend to report losses later compared to non-overconfident managers.
A specific form of accounting conservatism is large one-time write-offs, commonly known as
taking a big bath, highlighting the magnitude of these write-offs. This paper argues that CEOs
overconfidence determines the likelihood of taking a big bath after being hired, providing a poten-
tial channel through which the results of Ahmed and Duellman (2013) can arise. Recognition of
losses is particularly relevant at CEO turnovers as empirical evidence indicates that they are more
frequent (Johnson et al. 2011) and more extreme in the turnover year (Strong and Meyer 1987).
When new CEOs step into office they often recognise problems ignored by their predecessors
(Elliott and Shaw 1988), and managerial change induces restructuring (Strong and Meyer
1987). Consequently, managers engage in write-offs.
© 2020 The Author(s). Published by Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group
This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives License
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/), which permits non-commercial re-use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium,
provided the original work is properly cited, and is not altered, transformed, or built upon in any way.
*Email: pierk@ese.eur.nl
Accounting and Business Research, 2020
https://doi.org/10.1080/00014788.2020.1783634
Overconfident CEOs overestimate their ability relative to other managers and are more opti-
mistic about the company’s projects when these projects are managed by them. Thus, if CEOs
report in accordance with their overconfident beliefs, this will result in a lower likelihood of enga-
ging in a big bath especially at CEO turnover. When overconfident managers fail to report these
write-downs in the year of the turnover and postpone them to future periods, they do not ‘clear the
air’ but ‘muddy the waters’ and degrade the firm’s information environment (Haggard et al.
2015).
In the empirical analyses, I employ several measures of CEO overconfidence used in prior
literature based on the CEOs stock option portfolios (e.g. Malmendier and Tate 2008), on their
investment behaviour or on the magnitude of their capital expenditure in comparison to their
industry peers. Following Elliott and Shaw (1988) and in line with recent literature (e.g.
Haggard et al. 2015), I use the magnitude of write-offs in the form of special items to measure
big baths.
The results support the empirical prediction. I find that overconfident CEOs are about 6.3–
10.6 percent less likely to engage in a big bath in the turnover year than non-overconfident
CEOs. Furthermore, I find that this difference is only prevalent in the year of the turnover but
generally not in the years before or after the turnover.1
An alternative explanation for the finding could be that there is self-selection of non-overcon-
fident managers into firms with higher potential for large write-offs in the turnover year. I address
potential endogeneity and omitted correlated variables concerns in several ways. First, I show that
the observed big bath choices are not driven by whether CEO turnover is forced. Big baths are
especially prevalent in forced turnovers (Pourciau 1993, Wells 2002). Second, I use entropy bal-
ancing so that the first and second moments of all covariates in the year of the turnover are the
same between overconfident and non-overconfident managers. This mitigates concerns that
firm characteristics simultaneously explain the choice to hire a CEO of a certain behavioural
type and determine the predicted big bath pattern. Third, by controlling in big bath regressions
for the behavioural type of the outgoing CEO, I alleviate the concern that non-overconfident
CEOs are selected to clean up bloated asset values left behind by overconfident CEOs. Fourth,
I include firm fixed effects to control for time-invariant firm characteristics. The results remain
qualitatively similar in all specifications.
This paper contributes to the literature by showing that differences in accounting conservatism
in the form of write-offs across overconfident and non-overconfident managers only arise in the
year of CEO turnover and not in subsequent years. This is in contrast to Ahmed and Duellman’s
findings (2013) that suggest that overconfident managers are generally less conservative in their
accounting policies. Their market and accruals-based measures of conservatism do not explicitly
identify one-time write-offs or any other channels through which accounting conservatism can be
practiced. I add to their paper by showing that big baths at CEO turnovers are a potential channel
for their findings. Investors should be aware that when overconfident managers fail to report these
write-downs, earnings are overstated and the financial reporting does not accurately reflect the
underlying economics of the firm, thereby degrading the firm’s information environment. Further-
more, my results suggest that investors should especially focus on CEOs (non)overconfidence at
CEO turnover; in all other periods, this CEO characteristic is of less importance.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 develops the empirical hypothesis
and section 3 introduces the research methodology. In section 4, I interpret the results and section 5
mitigates endogeneity concerns. Section 6 presents robustness tests and section 7 concludes.
1One measure of overconfidence also shows differences in the fourth year after the turnover. The results can
be found in Panel C of Table 3.
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2. Literature review and hypothesis development
Recent literature has documented several links between overconfidence and more aggressive
accounting policies. For example, Schrand and Zechman (2012) report that overconfidence is
related to financial misreporting and fraud, whereas Ahmed and Duellman (2013) find a negative
relation between managerial overconfidence and accounting conservatism. Hribar and Yang
(2016), Libby and Rennekamp (2012) and Hilary and Hsu (2011) indicate that overconfident
managers are more likely to engage in more specific and optimistic management forecasts, and
Davis et al. (2014) show that they use more positive language in conference calls. Hsieh et al.
(2014) find that they are more likely to engage in income-increasing earnings management
even after the introduction of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. Wong and Zhang (2014) show that
CEO optimism is a source of analyst forecast bias.
These results are not surprising as overconfident managers systematically overestimate their
abilities and consequently the future cash flows they are able to generate. In line with the literature
on CEO overconfidence and accounting outcomes (e.g. Ahmed and Duellman 2013), I argue that
overconfident CEOs overestimate their ability relative to other managers. Consequently, they are
more optimistic about the company’s projects and they are more likely to overestimate the like-
lihood and magnitude of projects that go well and underestimate the likelihood and magnitude of
projects that do not go well. This overestimation has important implications for managers’
accounting decisions as they will tend to delay loss recognition (Ahmed and Duellman 2013).
When CEOs report in accordance with their overconfident beliefs, this will result in a lower like-
lihood of engaging in a big bath. When new CEOs take the reins, they recognise problems ignored
by their predecessors (Elliott and Shaw 1988), and managerial change induces restructuring
(Strong and Meyer 1987). I expect that overconfident managers are less likely to show this
pattern at CEO turnover.
HYPOTHESIS: Incoming overconfident CEOs are less likely to engage in big baths compared
to incoming non-overconfident CEOs in the turnover year.
3. Research methodology
3.1. Measurement of overconfidence
Following Malmendier and Tate (2008), I construct the overconfidence measures based on execu-
tive option holdings. CEOs are classified as overconfident if they hold an option until maturity
which is at least 40 percent2 in-the-money at the year-end prior to maturity (OC40). Thus, over-
confidence is considered as an inherent, time-invariant personal characteristic of CEOs. The
rationale for relying on the option exercise behaviour to classify overconfident and non-overcon-
fident managers is the following: CEOs face a trade-off between exercising their options and
retaining them for later use. By retaining their options, they maintain the right to purchase
company stock at potentially more favourable conditions in the future. The downside of this strat-
egy is that it involves substantial costs for the CEO in terms of exposure to idiosyncratic risk.
Executive stock options typically have a maturity of ten years and become vested after two to
four years. Furthermore, CEOs are legally prohibited from short-selling their company’s stock
in the US. Given the large proportion of personal wealth tied to their company, diversification
abilities across alternative investments are also limited. Besides financial exposure, substantial
human capital is also tied to the company (Malmendier and Tate 2008). Consequently, CEOs
2I additionally use other thresholds and classify CEOs as overconfident if they hold an option until maturity
which is at least 20, 60, 80 and 100 percent in-the-money at the year-end prior to maturity. The results remain
qualitatively the same.
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can be considered as under-diversified investors who have large exposure to their company’s risk.
Thus, a non-overconfident CEO should divest as soon as the option is sufficiently in-the-money
because the cost of delayed exercise typically exceeds its option value. In contrast, an overconfi-
dent CEO will not likely exercise stock options in this situation.
Considering CEO overconfidence as a fixed effect allows me to exploit within-firm variation
in a CEO turnover setting. However, I acknowledge that there might also be a time-varying part of
an individual’s overconfidence that impacts his/her decisions. Therefore, I run the tests with
additional measures also to ensure that the respective managers’ level of overconfidence is
measured at the time of CEO change.
Similar to Schrand and Zechman (2012), I use a measure of overconfidence based on the
dollar value of exercisable options. Managers are identified as overconfident if the dollar value
of their exercisable options (measured as the difference between the current stock price and the
average exercise price of the options times the number of options held) exceeds the industry
median based on three-digit SIC codes in the respective year (SZ).
To further alleviate potential concerns associated with using option-based measures, I also
employ two investment-based measures of overconfidence. For example, Malmendier and Tate
(2005) show that overconfidence relates to firms’ investment decisions. In line with Ahmed and
Duellman (2013), OVERINV is coded one if the residual of industry-year regressions of total
asset growth on sales growth is positive. Similarly, I classify CEOs as overconfident when
capital expenditures deflated by lagged total assets exceed the industry-year median (CAPEX).
3.2. Measurement of big baths
Following Elliott and Shaw (1988), I classify all firm-years with special items (SPI, Compustat
item #17) less than minus one percent of total assets as big bath years. Special items include
any non-recurring items, impairment of goodwill, non-recurring inventory write-downs, bad
debt expenses, restructuring costs, and provisions for doubtful accounts.3 Special items could
occur predominantly in a specific year due to economic downturns or other exogenous shocks
(e.g. natural disasters). This should not have an impact in this setting as CEO changes are distrib-
uted over a period of 19 years for both groups (overconfident vs. non-overconfident) and both
groups are approximately equally distributed over time.
3.3. Control variables
Besides the main variable of interest, I control for the following variables which could influence
big bath behaviour.
Routine vs. Non-Routine CEO Turnover: Pourciau (1993) and Wells (2002) show that big
baths are especially pronounced after non-routine turnovers when negative outcomes can
easily be attributed to the CEO who has left the firm in discord. I hand-collect data on routine
and non-routine turnovers following Hazarika et al. (2012). A CEO turnover is classified as
non-routine (NONROUTINE) ‘if (i) the CEO was fired, forced out from the position, or departed
due to policy differences; or (ii) the departing CEO’s age is below 60, and the announcement does
not report that the CEO died, left because of poor health, or accepted another position elsewhere
or within the firm; or (iii) the CEO ‘retires’ but leaves the job within six months of the ‘retirement
announcement’.’
3In my sample about 75% of special items consist of asset write-downs, goodwill impairment and restructur-
ing costs.
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Former CEO Type: If former CEOs were overconfident, they might have pursued less conser-
vative accounting and depreciated less than necessary. Consequently, assets might be overvalued
and big baths would be a justified correction of inflated asset values. Therefore, I control for the
former CEO type.
Past Special Items: Elliott and Hanna (1996) show that firms repeatedly write-down assets,
indicating that past asset write-downs are correlated with future ones. Therefore, I include a
control variable (PRIORSPI) for the average special items of the last three years.
Conservatism: Ahmed and Duellman (2013) show that overconfident managers use less con-
servative accounting which could lead to fewer big baths. I control for the level of accounting
conservatism prior to CEO turnover by including the average accruals over the three previous
years (PRIORACC). The measure is multiplied by minus one so that larger values denote
greater accounting conservatism.
Firm Performance: Prior research suggests that weak firm performance is related to more
aggressive earnings management. If current firm performance is poor, earnings are shifted
from the future to the current period (e.g. DeFond and Park 1997, Keating and Zimmerman
1999). Furthermore, performance could be mechanically linked to the magnitude of special
items since poor performance might trigger extraordinary write-offs. To control for firm perform-
ance, I include return on assets (ROA), which is income before extraordinary items and before
special items divided by total assets at the beginning of the year.
Firm Size: The size of the firm could also affect the earnings management behaviour of man-
agers. Skinner (1993), for example, shows that firm size increases the likelihood of income-
decreasing depreciation procedures. Further, big baths might be related to firm size as more
visible firms behave differently with respect to earnings manipulation. SIZE is measured as the
natural logarithm of total assets in millions of dollars.
Debt: The leverage ratio of a firm is related to debt covenant violations. Various papers show
that earnings are manipulated before and after debt covenant violations (e.g. Press and Weintrop
1990, DeFond and Jiambalvo 1994, Sweeney 1994). Covenant violations are most often triggered
by exceeding preset debt levels. Thus, I control for leverage in all regressions and define LEV as
total debt divided by total assets at the beginning of the year.
Corporate Governance: Weak internal control systems are often correlated with poor earnings
quality (Doyle et al. 2007). I include the Entrenchment Index (GOVINDEX) proposed by
Bebchuk et al. (2009) to account for the impact of corporate governance mechanisms on earnings
management and the Gompers et al. (2003) governance index (GINDEX) as a robustness check
(not tabulated).
Managerial Compensation: Earnings-based compensation of CEOs provides several incen-
tives to manipulate earnings. Holthausen et al. (1995) show that managers engage in income-
decreasing earnings management when bonus schemes are at their maximum. Bergstresser and
Philippon (2006) point out that earnings manipulation is especially prevalent if compensation
is closely tied to firm value. I collect information on CEO compensation (bonus and salary)
from ExecuComp. BONUS is defined as the annual bonus payment divided by the sum of
bonus and salary.
Growth Opportunities: Missing earnings benchmarks such as analyst forecasts can be particu-
larly severe for high-growth firms (Skinner and Sloan 2002), which may incentivise them to
manipulate earnings. To control for growth opportunities, I include the market-to-book ratio
(MTB) and future growth in the regressions. MTB is equal to the market value of a company’s
assets (fiscal year closing price times common shares outstanding plus preferred stock plus
total liabilities divided by the book value of a company’s assets). GROWTH is an ex-post
measure of growth opportunities and is defined as the relative increase in market value in the
next three years.
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3.4. Big bath model
I use a logit model to test the paper’s hypothesis, using BIGBATH as the dependent variable.
BIGBATH is a dummy variable that is equal to one if special items are less than minus one
percent of total assets. OC is the respective overconfident measure and is equal to one if the
CEO is classified as overconfident and zero if classified as non-overconfident. OC40 is the over-
confidence classification based on 40 percent in-the-money at the year-end prior to maturity. SZ
classifies managers as overconfident if the moneyness of their exercisable options exceeds the
industry median based on three-digit SIC codes.OVERINV is coded one if the residual of an indus-
try-year regression of total asset growth on sales growth is positive, and zero otherwise. CAPEX is
coded one if the capital expenditures exceed the industry-year median, and zero otherwise.
I include ten years surrounding the CEO turnover to investigate whether the different big bath
behaviour between overconfident and non-overconfident CEOs occurs only in the turnover year
or also before or in the subsequent years. I use indicators for each year that the new CEO is in
office. Thus, I include six indicator variables, for the year of the turnover and the five years
after the turnover (e.g. YEAR0 is the year of the turnover and YEAR1 is the year thereafter).
Next, I interact each year with the respective overconfidence measure (e.g. YEAR0*OC,
YEAR1*OC, etc.). I expect a negative coefficient of the interaction of the turnover year with
the overconfidence indicator (YEAR0*OC).






lj∗YEARit∗OC + controlsit + FEit + 1it
where p is the probability of engaging in big bath accounting.
4. Sample and results
I collect information about CEO compensation and CEO turnover from ExecuComp and merge
the data with Compustat financials. I limit the sample to those CEOs who have the chance to
reveal themselves as overconfident or not. CEOs who are only active for a few years cannot
be classified as overconfident because there is no information in ExecuComp as to whether
they hold an option package until maturity. I delete financial institutions from the sample
because of their special asset and impairment structure and limit the sample to CEOs who
stayed in office for at least one full year after CEO turnover. Thereby, I ensure that the CEO
can benefit from a potential big bath.
I consider 1,175 CEO changes between 1993 and 2012 and the sample consists of 11,642
firm-year observations surrounding the turnover year [−5,+5] to investigate whether big baths
occur more frequently and more severe during CEO turnover.4 I include five years before and
after CEO change. I limit the years after CEO change to firm years when the new CEO was
still in office. Panel A of Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics of my sample. The incoming
CEO is classified as overconfident in approximately 25.7–56.5 percent of the firms (depending
on the measure). On average 1.3 percent of total assets are written off in the form of special
items (SPI) and 27.8 percent of all firms have more than one percent special items
(BIGBATH). The average return on assets (ROA) is 7.0 percent, and the average leverage ratio
(LEV) is 19.7 percent. The ratio of cash bonus to total cash salary (BONUS) has a mean of
30.8 percent. The average market-to-book ratio (MTB) is approximately two.
4The 1,175 CEO changes took place in 1,150 different firms.
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Table 1. Summary Statistics.
Variable N Mean Sd Min P25 P50 P75 Max
Panel A. Full Sample
BIGBATHt 11,642 0.278 0.448 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000
SPIt 11,642 −0.013 0.038 −0.243 −0.012 −0.001 0.000 0.070
OC40t 11,642 0.257 0.437 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000
SZt 11,642 0.551 0.497 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
OVERINVt 11,642 0.297 0.457 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000
CAPEXt 11,642 0.565 0.496 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
PRIORSPIt 11,642 −0.001 0.013 −0.702 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.167
NONROUTINEt 11,642 0.009 0.093 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000
PRIORACCt 11,642 0.010 0.032 −0.178 −0.006 0.005 0.021 0.202
ROAt 11,642 0.070 0.081 −0.234 0.032 0.062 0.106 0.375
SIZEt 11,642 7.517 1.655 3.680 6.330 7.451 8.637 11.601
LEVt 11,642 0.197 0.155 0.000 0.062 0.188 0.298 0.695
GOVINDEXt 11,642 2.791 1.144 0.000 2.000 2.778 3.000 6.000
BONUSt 11,642 0.308 0.119 0.000 0.313 0.313 0.313 0.702
MTBt-1 11,642 1.970 1.293 0.737 1.198 1.540 2.209 8.390
GROWTHt 11,642 1.411 1.083 0.147 0.872 1.119 1.591 7.475
BIGBATHt=0 BIGBATHt=1
Variable N Mean N Mean
Panel B. Comparison of Non-Big Bath Firms (BIGBATHt=0) with Big Bath Firms (BIGBATHt=1)
SPIt 8,407 0.001 3,235 −0.051***
OC40t 8,407 0.270 3,235 0.222***
SZt 8,407 0.568 3,235 0.509***
OVERINVt 8,407 0.313 3,235 0.254***
CAPEXt 8,407 0.573 3,235 0.544***
PRIORSPIt 8,407 −0.001 3,235 0.065***
NONROUTINEt 8,407 0.006 3,235 −0.003***
PRIORACCt 8,407 0.010 3,235 0.016












Variable N Mean N Mean
SIZEt 8,407 7.540 3,235 0.062**
LEVt 8,407 0.194 3,235 7.457***
GOVINDEXt 8,407 2.788 3,235 0.207
BONUSt 8,407 0.310 3,235 2.798***
MTBt-1 8,407 1.984 3,235 0.301***
GROWTHt 8,407 1.386 3,235 1.936***
Year (1) OC40 = 0 (2) OC40 = 1 Delta (1) – (2)
Panel C. Big Baths Around the Turnover Year
YEAR-5 0.224 0.206 0.019
YEAR-4 0.260 0.181 0.079**
YEAR-3 0.293 0.248 0.045
YEAR-2 0.251 0.189 0.062*
YEAR-1 0.308 0.278 0.030
YEAR0 0.368 0.252 0.116***
YEAR1 0.317 0.297 0.020
YEAR2 0.293 0.211 0.082**
YEAR 3 0.294 0.283 0.010
YEAR 4 0.292 0.254 0.037
YEAR 5 0.306 0.258 0.048
This table provides descriptive statistics in Panel A. Panel B compares the mean values for firms with BIGBATH=0 and BIGBATH=1. Panel C shows the percentage of firm-years that
engage in big bath accounting separately for firms that hire a manager classified as non-overconfident manager (OC40 = 0) and overconfident (OC40 = 1). BIGBATH is a dummy variable
which equals one if special items divided by total assets are less than minus one percent. SPI is special items divided by total assets.OC40 is the overconfidence classification based on 40
percent in-the-moneyness at the year-end prior to maturity. SZ classifies managers as overconfident if the moneyness of their exercisable options exceeds the industry median based on
three-digit SIC codes. OVERINV is coded one if the residual of an industry-year regression of total asset growth on sales growth is positive, and zero otherwise. CAPEX is coded one if
capital expenditures exceed the industry-year median, and zero otherwise. PRIORSPI is the average special items of the last three years prior to CEO turnover. NONROUTINE is coded
one if the management change is non-routine following Hazarika et al. (2012). PRIORACC is the average accruals over the last three years prior to CEO turnover. ROA is return on assets
measured as income before extraordinary items and special items divided by total assets. SIZE is total assets in log $million. LEV is total debt divided by total assets. GOVINDEX is the
Bebchuk et al. (2009) entrenchment index. BONUS is a manager’s annual bonus payment divided by the sum of bonus and salary. MTB is the market value of equity plus book value of
debt divided by total assets. GROWTH is the relative increase in market value in the next three years. ***,**,* indicate significance between the means of Panel B and Panel C based on





PanelB of Table 1 shows themean values for non-big bathfirms and big bathfirms. Ifind that big
bath firms, on average, write-off 5.1 percent of total assets. Furthermore, in line withmy predictions,
big bath firms have fewer overconfident CEOs, independent of which measure is used. Panel C of
Table 1 shows the fraction of big baths around the CEO turnover, separately for overconfident
and non-overconfident CEOs. The Panel shows that big baths are also present before and after the
turnover year.However, the fraction of big baths, relative to years before and after turnover, increases
in the year of the turnover for non-overconfident (37%) but not for overconfident CEOs (25%). The
difference in the turnover year is statistically significant based on a two-sided t-test.
Pearson and Spearman correlations are shown in Table 2. BIGBATH is negatively correlated
(p<0.01) with all measures for overconfidence (OC40, SZ, OVERINVand CAPEX). The measures
of overconfidence are positively correlated with each other and in most cases this correlation is
also statistically significant at the 1 percent level. Furthermore, the overconfidence measures
are positively correlated with ROA, BONUS, and MTB. BIGBATH is negatively correlated with
ROA, SIZE, and BONUS.
To test the hypothesis that overconfident CEOs are less likely to engage in big baths compared
with non-overconfident CEOs, I estimate logit regressions with BIGBATH as the dependent vari-
able. In the regressions I control for the variables PRIORSPI, PRIORACC, ROA, SIZE, LEV,
GOVINDEX, BONUS, MTB, and GROWTH. The models include industry and time fixed
effects when indicated. Standard errors are clustered at the firm and year level. The marginal
effects in Table 3 represent the change in the probability of engaging in a big bath for a one-
unit change in the respective independent variable evaluated at the mean of all other independent
variables. In Panel A, I only include a dummy variable for the turnover year (YEAR0) and interact
it with the respective measure of overconfidence (YEAR0*OC). Thus, I compare the turnover year
to all years before and after CEO turnover. Across all measures, I find that non-overconfident
managers are more likely to engage in a big bath at CEO turnover, but that overconfident man-
agers do not show this pattern. On average, an overconfident CEO is about 4.3–12.0 percent
less likely to engage in big bath accounting. Thus, I find support for the hypothesis that overcon-
fident CEOs engage in big baths less frequently than non-overconfident CEOs.
In Panel B, I include separate indicators for each year after CEO turnover and the respective
interactions to investigate if the two types of managers show differences in the likelihood of
taking a big bath in all years or whether these differences are especially visible in the year of
the turnover. In all specifications, non-overconfident managers are more likely to engage in earn-
ings baths in the year of the turnover, and overconfidence of the new CEO is negatively related to
a big bath in the year of the turnover. No consistent pattern can be observed in other years.5 Panel
C of Table 3 includes control variables. The effects of the control variables are in line with the
findings of prior literature on big baths. In particular, big baths are more likely to occur after
non-routine turnovers. After a CEO has been fired or forced out, the new CEO will engage
more often in large write-offs that can be attributed to his predecessor. Furthermore, past
special items are negatively associated with BIGBATH.
5. Addressing endogeneity
Firm characteristics may influence the firm’s decision to hire an overconfident CEO and simul-
taneously explain the predicted big bath pattern. I control for potential endogeneity in various
ways. First, I control for non-routine turnover events because big baths are especially prevalent
5In model 3, the coefficient of YEAR4*OC is of similar statistical significance and of similar magnitude as
YEAR0*OC.
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Table 2. Correlations.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15)
(1) BIGBATHt −0.79* −0.05* −0.05* −0.06* −0.03* −0.04* 0.05* 0.02 −0.05* −0.02 0.03* −0.01 −0.03* −0.03*
(2) OC40t −0.62* 0.07* 0.04* 0.04* 0.02 0.07* −0.04* −0.02 0.03* −0.02 −0.04* −0.03* 0.04* 0.05*
(3) SZt −0.05* 0.04* 0.11* 0.02 0.01 0.01 −0.01 −0.05* 0.09* −0.03* −0.02 −0.01 0.04* 0.08*
(4) OVERINVt −0.05* 0.05* 0.11* 0.03* 0.09* −0.01 −0.01 0.01 0.17* 0.21* 0.03* 0.07* 0.02* 0.12*
(5) CAPEXt −0.06* 0.05* 0.02 0.03* 0.16* 0.01 −0.02 −0.01 0.08* 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.08*
(6) PRIORSPIt −0.03* 0.03* 0.01 0.09* 0.16* −0.00 −0.02 −0.06* 0.15* −0.01 −0.02* 0.03* 0.00 0.15*
(7) NONROUTINEt −0.07* 0.07* 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.02 −0.19* −0.01 0.02 0.01 −0.00 −0.01 −0.01 0.00
(8) PRIORACCt 0.05* −0.04* −0.01 −0.01 −0.02 −0.02 −0.16* 0.00 −0.02* −0.01 0.00 −0.00 0.00 −0.01
(9) ROAt 0.01 0.01 −0.07* 0.00 −0.02 −0.03* 0.00 0.01 −0.15* 0.15* 0.05* −0.01 0.01 −0.05*
(10) SIZEt −0.06* 0.05* 0.08* 0.15* 0.07* 0.14* 0.05* −0.03* −0.15* −0.09* −0.31* −0.03* 0.08* 0.67*
(11) LEVt −0.02 0.06* −0.03* 0.21* 0.00 −0.02 0.03* −0.01 0.17* −0.05* 0.32* 0.10* 0.04* −0.15*
(12)GOVINDEXt 0.04* −0.02 −0.02 0.03* −0.01 −0.02* 0.02 0.00 0.05* −0.22* 0.27* 0.10* 0.00 −0.34*
(13) BONUSt 0.01 0.01 −0.02 0.05* 0.01 0.02 0.00 −0.0057 0.01 −0.05* 0.05* 0.08* −0.05* −0.10*
(14) MTBt-1 −0.04* 0.04* 0.04* 0.03* 0.01 −0.00 −0.01 −0.001 0.01 0.08* 0.05* −0.01 −0.07* 0.08*
(15) GROWTHt −0.02 0.00 0.05* 0.08* 0.07* 0.12* −0.03* −0.01 −0.05* 0.54* −0.20* −0.27* −0.14* 0.07*





Table 3. Big Bath Regressions.
Dependent Variable: BIGBATHt Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
OC40 SZ OVERINV CAPEX
Panel A: Big Bath Regressions – Turnover Year
YEAR0*OCt −0.110*** −0.120*** −0.069** −0.043**
(0.035) (0.028) (0.031) (0.021)
YEAR0 0.089*** 0.128*** 0.084*** 0.088***
(0.014) (0.017) (0.013) (0.015)
Year-FE No No No No
Industry-FE No No No No
N 11,642 11,642 11,642 11,642
Pseudo R-squared 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.002
Panel B: Big Bath Regressions – Years after Turnover
YEAR0*OCt −0.104*** −0.118*** −0.091** −0.042*
(0.032) (0.027) (0.036) (0.022)
YEAR1*OCt −0.012 −0.033 −0.043* −0.037*
(0.025) (0.038) (0.023) (0.021)
YEAR2*OCt −0.084*** −0.045* −0.035 −0.002
(0.029) (0.027) (0.028) (0.021)
YEAR3*OCt −0.010 −0.036 −0.050 −0.023
(0.032) (0.023) (0.043) (0.027)
YEAR4*OCt −0.036 −0.004 −0.101** 0.015
(0.037) (0.025) (0.043) (0.038)
YEAR5*OCt −0.035 −0.009 −0.043* 0.009
(0.032) (0.027) (0.023) (0.034)
YEAR0 0.082*** 0.119*** 0.082*** 0.080***
(0.015) (0.017) (0.014) (0.016)
YEAR1 0.028** 0.041 0.034*** 0.044***
(0.011) (0.027) (0.013) (0.014)
YEAR2 0.005 0.008 −0.008 −0.015
(0.018) (0.022) (0.016) (0.019)
YEAR3 0.004 0.018 0.012 0.012
(0.018) (0.020) (0.016) (0.019)
YEAR4 0.000 −0.011 0.013 −0.021
(0.024) (0.026) (0.024) (0.023)
YEAR5 0.016 0.008 0.014 −0.001
(0.019) (0.020) (0.020) (0.024)
Year-FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry-FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 11,642 11,642 11,642 11,642
Pseudo R-squared 0.054 0.055 0.055 0.053
Panel C: Big Bath Regressions – Controls and Fixed Effects
YEAR0*OCt −0.091*** −0.106*** −0.065* −0.063*
(0.034) (0.028) (0.039) (0.036)
YEAR1*OCt −0.005 −0.025 −0.038 −0.029
(0.026) (0.041) (0.024) (0.024)
YEAR2*OCt −0.054 −0.041 −0.037 0.003
(0.031) (0.026) (0.029) (0.022)
YEAR3*OCt −0.005 −0.029 −0.053 −0.016
(0.033) (0.023) (0.046) (0.028)
YEAR4*OCt −0.032 0.004 −0.106** 0.023
(0.038) (0.026) (0.045) (0.039)
YEAR5*OCt −0.032 −0.006 −0.024 0.017
(Continued)
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in non-routine turnovers (Pourciau 1993, Wells 2002). Second, I include firm fixed effects in the
linear probability model of Panel A of Table 4 to control for time-invariant unobservable firm-
specific characteristics. I still find that overconfident CEOs are less likely to engage in a big
bath, although the magnitude of the effect is smaller compared to Table 3. Overconfident
Table 3. Continued.
Dependent Variable: BIGBATHt Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
OC40 SZ OVERINV CAPEX
(0.034) (0.028) (0.026) (0.037)
YEAR0 0.043 0.069** 0.050** 0.012
(0.032) (0.033) (0.025) (0.024)
NONROUTINEt 0.126*** 0.123*** 0.121** 0.126***
(0.047) (0.047) (0.048) (0.046)
YEAR1 0.022* 0.033 0.030** 0.036**
(0.011) (0.029) (0.013) (0.014)
YEAR2 0.006 0.006 −0.007 −0.018
(0.019) (0.021) (0.017) (0.020)
YEAR3 0.004 0.016 0.015 0.010
(0.019) (0.021) (0.018) (0.020)
YEAR4 0.002 −0.012 0.018 −0.022
(0.025) (0.027) (0.025) (0.025)
YEAR5 0.021 0.012 0.020 0.000
(0.019) (0.020) (0.020) (0.025)
OCt-1 −0.007 0.002 −0.056*** 0.065**
(0.018) (0.020) (0.021) (0.032)
PRIORSPIt −1.952*** −1.987*** −1.900*** −2.034***
(0.422) (0.402) (0.418) (0.459)
PRIORACCt 0.119 0.126 0.114 0.140
(0.187) (0.185) (0.190) (0.190)
ROAt −0.409*** −0.397*** −0.408*** −0.413***
(0.108) (0.108) (0.111) (0.112)
SIZEt 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
LEVt 0.092** 0.094** 0.096** 0.094**
(0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.038)
GOVINDEXt −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
BONUSt −0.072* −0.066* −0.074* −0.076*
(0.040) (0.037) (0.040) (0.040)
MTBt-1 0.011* 0.012** 0.012* 0.011*
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
GROWTHt 0.012*** 0.011*** 0.012*** 0.012***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 11,642 11,642 11,642 11,642
Pseudo R-squared 0.063 0.063 0.064 0.062
This table provides marginal effects for logit regressions. Variables are defined in Table 1. Panel A only includes a dummy
variable for the turnover year (YEAR0) and the interaction with the respective measure of overconfidence (YEAR0*OC).
OC is the respective overconfidence classification. Panel B also includes separate indicators for each year after CEO
turnover and the interactions with the overconfidence measures. YEARX is an indicator variable coded 1 in year X year
after CEO turnover (e.g. YEAR1 is the first year after CEO turnover). Panel C additionally includes control variables.
The regressions include industry and year dummies when indicated. Standard errors are clustered by firm and year and
are provided below the coefficients. ***,**,* indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level, respectively.
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CEOs are between 5.3 and 7.7 percent less likely to take a big bath. Third, I include random
effects in the regression in Panel B of Table 4 and the magnitude of the coefficient is between
3.4 and 9.3 percent.
Fourth, I entropy balance the sample to adjust for inequalities in the covariates’ distributions
of first and second moments between firms that hire an overconfident manager and those that
hire a non-overconfident manager (Hainmueller 2012). Since prior tables show that differences
between the two types of managers are only prominent in the turnover year, I only use the turn-
over year in these specifications. Specifically, I reweigh control group observations in such a
way that they have the same mean and variance as the covariates in the treatment group.
Panel A of Table 5 shows the summary statistics of the treatment and control groups before
and after balancing. Although the means and variance are all statistically different between
the two groups prior to balancing, I do not observe differences in the reweighted sample.
Panel B shows that using the weights from the entropy balancing does not change the interpret-
ation of my results. In Panel C, I additionally match the entropy balanced sample by year so that
CEO turnover is equally distributed over time for the two types of managers.6 This rules out that
the findings are driven by any changes over time, e.g. inflation or economic trends. The sample
size in this test is reduced due to the matching algorithm. The results are in line with my
predictions.
Table 4. Firm Fixed Effects and Random Fixed Effects.
Dependent Variable: BIGBATHt Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
OC40 SZ OVERINV CAPEX
Panel A. Linear Probability Model Including Firm Fixed Effects
YEAR0*OCt −0.070** −0.077*** −0.053* −0.060*
(0.028) (0.027) (0.029) (0.034)
YEAR0 0.038 0.064* 0.055*** 0.035
(0.033) (0.033) (0.018) (0.022)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 11,642 11,642 11,642 11,642
Adjusted R-squared 0.19 0.19 0.18 0.19
Panel B. Random Effects Logistic Regression
YEAR0*OCt −0.075** −0.093*** −0.034* −0.054*
(0.026) (0.027) (0.017) (0.032)
YEAR0 0.051* 0.080** 0.062*** 0.038*
(0.031) (0.033) (0.018) (0.023)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 11,642 11,642 11,642 11,642
Pseudo R-squared 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.08
This table provides the results of a linear probability model in Panel A and random effects logistic regression in Panel
B. YEAR0 is the turnover year. OC is the respective overconfidence classification. Variables are defined in Table 1.
Standard errors are clustered by firm and year and are provided below the coefficients. ***,**,* indicate significance at
the 1, 5, and 10 percent level, respectively.
6The matching procedure matches one treated observation (overconfident) with one un-treated observation
(non-overconfident) by year. This matching procedure results in more successful matches when observations
classified as overconfident and non-overconfident are equally distributed over time. Since the distribution of
managers classified as overconfident and non-overconfident over time varies across overconfidence
measures, the number of observations also varies in Panel C of Table 5.
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Table 5. Big Bath Regressions in Turnover Year – Entropy Balancing.
TREATMENT CONTROL ORIGINAL CONTROL BALANCED
Mean Variance Mean Variance Mean Variance
Panel A: Original Sample
NONROUTINEt 0.068 0.064 0.093 0.085*** 0.068 0.064
OCt-1 0.833 0.139 0.800 0.160 0.833 0.139
PRIORSPIt −0.011 0.001 −0.015** 0.002*** −0.011 0.001
PRIORACCt 0.014 0.001 0.008*** 0.001*** 0.013 0.001
ROAt 0.084 0.006 0.060 0.007** 0.083 0.006
SIZEt 7.498 2.200 7.636 2.775** 7.496 2.200
LEVt 0.192 0.023 0.199 0.024 0.192 0.023
GOVINDEXt 2.733 1.291 2.770 1.332 2.732 1.291
BONUSt 0.340 0.060 0.282*** 0.066 0.340 0.060
MTBt-1 2.115 1.983 1.948** 1.831*** 2.115 1.982
GROWTHt 1.485 0.847 1.453 1.364*** 1.486 0.850
Panel B: Big Bath Regressions – Entropy Balancing
Dependent Variable: Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
BIGBATHt OC40 SZ OVERINV CAPEX
OCt −0.083*** −0.101*** −0.054* −0.077*
(0.030) (0.030) (0.032) (0.042)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pseudo R-squared 0.15 0.12 0.08 0.18





Panel C: Big Bath Regressions – Entropy Balancing and Matching on Years
Dependent Variable: Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
BIGBATHt OC40 SZ OVERINV CAPEX
OCt −0.133*** −0.094*** −0.071* −0.073*
(0.038) (0.032) (0.039) (0.043)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pseudo R-squared 0.15 0.12 0.09 0.17
N 582 1,038 659 1,023
This table provides marginal effects for logit regressions using BIGBATHt as the dependent variable of an entropy balanced sample. Panel A shows the summary statistics before and after
entropy balancing. Panel B displays the entropy balanced regression results. In Panel C, treatment and control firms are additionally matched on year. Variables are defined in Table 1. The










Fifth, I take a closer look at the decision made by the previous CEO. So far, the empirical
results include the variable PRIORSPI to control for write-offs in the previous period. In
Table 6, I additionally include separate indicators for the four years prior to the turnover
event. Thus, I compare all years relative to year minus 5, the first year of the sample. Table
6 splits the sample into firms where the incoming CEO is overconfident (OC=1) and non-over-
confident (OC=0). In line with the previous tables, I find that non-overconfident managers
engage in a big bath in the year of the turnover and overconfident managers do not.7 The differ-
ence in the likelihood is statistically significant. Interestingly, I also find a higher likelihood of a
big bath in the year prior to the CEO change (YEAR-1) independent of CEO type. This could be
driven by poor performance prior to CEO change. Most importantly, there is no statistical
difference in big bath behaviour between the two samples. This further alleviates self-selection
concerns Table 7.
Table 6. Big Bath Regressions – Years Prior to CEO Change.
Dependent Variable: BIGBATHt Model 1 Model 2 DIFF
OC=1 OC=0
YEAR-4 −0.046** 0.023 −0.069*
(0.023) (0.024)
YEAR-3 0.016 0.051** −0.035
(0.027) (0.021)
YEAR-2 −0.038 −0.001 −0.037
(0.030) (0.023)
YEAR-1 0.045* 0.062*** −0.017
(0.024) (0.023)
YEAR0 −0.037 0.079** −0.116***
(0.039) (0.033)
YEAR1 0.033 0.047** −0.014
(0.037) (0.021)
YEAR2 −0.042 0.031 −0.073**
(0.035) (0.031)
YEAR3 0.017 0.031 −0.014
(0.025) (0.029)
YEAR4 −0.010 0.028 −0.038
(0.031) (0.032)
YEAR5 0.002 0.052* −0.050
(0.041) (0.031)
Controls Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes
N 11,642 11,642
Pseudo R-squared 0.073 0.066
This table provides marginal effects for logit regressions using BIGBATHt as the dependent variable. OC is the
overconfidence classification based on 40 percent in-the-moneyness at the year-end prior to maturity. Variables are
defined in Table 1. The regressions include industry and year dummies. Standard errors are clustered by firm and year
and are provided below the coefficients. ***,**,* indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level, respectively.
7Unreported analyses show similar results for the other overconfidence measures with the exception of the
statistically significant differences in Year 2. In line with Table 3, there is a significant difference between
overconfident and non-overconfident in Year 2 when using the OC40 measure, but not when using the
other measures of overconfidence.
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6. Robustness tests and further results
6.1. Alternative big bath thresholds
This section tests the robustness of my results with respect to the thresholds for big baths. First, I
define big baths as dummy variable that is equal to one if special items are negative. Next,
BIGBATH is a dummy variable that is equal to one if special items are less than −0.5 percent
of total assets, less than −1 percent of total assets, less than −1.5 percent of total assets, or less
than −2 percent of total assets. The results suggest that the findings are not sensitive to the
measurement of big baths. Firms hiring an overconfident rather than a non-overconfident CEO
are less likely to engage in a big bath. The effect is statistically significant across all specifications.
I only report the results using the OC40 classification. However, using the alternative overconfi-
dence classifications leads to similar results.
6.2. Quarterly data
One potential concern with the analysis is the use of annual data. With annual data, I cannot be
sure that write-offs can be attributed to the new CEO. For example, the new CEO may have been
hired in the fourth fiscal quarter of the year, and write-offs may have taken place in the first three
quarters and therefore be attributable to the old CEO. To further ensure that the results are not
driven by write-offs of the outgoing CEO, I additionally investigate quarterly data on special
items. The results of Table 8 are similar in economic magnitude to those in the previous analyses:
Incoming overconfident CEOs are about 8.3–9.2 percent less likely to engage in a big bath in the
last fiscal quarter of the turnover year (BIGBATHt,4Q). The sample size of Table 8 is lower bcause
quarterly special items are not available for the entire time frame.
6.3. Discontinued operations
An alternative way of taking a big bath is disposing of a major line of business. The effect of the
disposal is reflected in discontinued operations (Compustat Item #66). Compared to special
items, discontinued operations are less frequent and lower in magnitude. In my sample, the
mean of discontinued operations is 0.08 percent of total assets. In line with the previous ana-
lyses, I define a big bath if discontinued operations are below minus one percent of total
assets. Table 9 repeats the analyses of Table 3 with BIGBATHt,DC as the dependent variable.
I find that overconfident managers are less likely to have discontinued operations at the time
Table 7. Big Bath Regressions – Alternative Big Bath Thresholds.
Dependent Variable: BIGBATHt (< 0.000) (< 0.005) (< 0.010) (< 0.015) (< 0.020)
OC40t −0.109*** −0.110*** −0.092** −0.095*** −0.049
0.027 0.036 0.039 0.034 0.035
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 1,175 1,175 1,175 1,175 1,175
Pseudo R-squared 0.111 0.102 0.112 0.104 0.099
This table provides marginal effects for logit regressions using BIGBATHt as the dependent variable. BIGBATH is defined
as a dummy variable that equals one if special items over total assets are less than the specified threshold in each column in
the turnover year. Variables are defined in Table 1. The regressions include industry and year dummies. Standard errors are
clustered by firm and year and are provided below the coefficients. ***,**,* indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent
level, respectively.
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of CEO turnover across all models. However, the results are only statistically significant in two
specifications.
6.4. Size of big baths
The findings show that overconfident managers are less likely to engage in a big bath in the turn-
over year. In untabulated results, I limit the sample to firms with negative special items. Thus, I
test whether managers take a smaller write-down conditional on taking the write-down. I do not
find statistically significant differences between overconfident and non-overconfident CEOs. I
conclude that overconfidence influences the likelihood of a big bath, but that the size of the
big bath is unrelated to overconfidence.
6.5. Internal vs. external CEO
The incoming CEO can either be hired externally or recruited from inside the firm. This could
affect the probability of engaging in a big bath and also be correlated with routine turnovers or
overconfidence. For a subset of observations, I examine the time when the CEO joined the
Table 9. Big Bath Regressions – Discontinued Operations.
Dependent Variable: Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
BIGBATHt,DC OC40 SZ OVERINV CAPEX
OCt −0.023** −0.018 −0.050** −0.002
0.011 0.015 0.021 0.017
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 1,175 1,175 1,175 1,175
Pseudo R-squared 0.150 0.144 0.146 0.140
This table provides marginal effects for logit regressions using big bath accounting as the dependent variable. BIGBATHDC
is defined as a dummy variable that equals one if discontinued operations divided by total assets are less than minus one
percent. OC is the respective overconfidence classification. Variables are defined in Table 1. The regressions include
industry and year dummies when indicated. Standard errors are clustered by firm and year and are provided below the
coefficients. ***,**,* indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level, respectively.
Table 8. Big Bath Regressions – 4th Quarter.
Dependent Variable: Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
BIGBATHt,4Q OC40 SZ OVERINV CAPEX
OCt −0.088** −0.092*** −0.083*** −0.086***
0.028 0.025 0.027 0.031
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 842 842 842 842
Pseudo R-squared 0.094 0.103 0.102 0.095
This table provides marginal effects for logit regressions using big bath accounting as the dependent variable. BIGBATH is
defined as a dummy variable that equals one if special items over total assets are less than minus 0.25 percent in the fourth
quarter of the turnover year. OC is the respective overconfidence classification. Variables are defined in Table 1. The
regressions include industry and year dummies when indicated. Standard errors are clustered by firm and year and are
provided below the coefficients. ***,**,* indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level, respectively.
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company to determine whether the CEO was an internal promotion or an external hire. I classify
CEOs as insiders if they joined the respective firm at least two years prior to the engagement as
CEO. I find that approximately 23 percent of the CEOs are external hires, which is positively cor-
related with a non-routine turnover (Coef. 0.116, P-Value: <0.01). In other words, when a CEO is
fired, it is more likely that an external CEO is hired. However, the decision to hire an internal or
external CEO is not correlated with the level of overconfidence of the CEO. In non-tabulated
results, I continue to find that overconfident CEOs are less likely to engage in big bath accounting
when I control for internal promotions or external hires.
6.6. Corporate governance
I additionally investigate the effect of corporate governance on the relation between overconfi-
dence and the likelihood of engaging in a big bath. Good corporate governance mechanisms
and external monitoring can help to align the write-off behaviour of overconfident CEOs with
the underlying economics of the firm. Unreported results show no differences when I partition
the sample based on low vs. high level the Bebchuk et al. (2009) entrenchment index. Alterna-
tively, I split the sample based on the Gompers et al. (2003) governance index (GINDEX).
Again, the results are inconclusive. However, both measures are proxies for the level of share-
holder rights and thus might not be able to capture governance structures that directly affect finan-
cial reporting. These findings are consistent with the results of Ahmed and Duellman (2013) and
Schrand and Zechman (2012). Ahmed and Duelman (2013) do not find consistent evidence that
external monitoring moderates the relation between overconfidence and accounting conservatism.
Similarly, Schrand and Zechman (2012) do not report systematic differences in governance struc-
tures between firms that misreport earnings and those that do not. In line with the arguments
above, they note that ‘the notion of good governance is difficult to identify and measure’.
7. Conclusion
Prior literature shows that CEOs use large write-offs in the year of the turnover (Murphy and Zim-
merman 1993) and that non-routine CEO changes explain cross-sectional variation in big baths at
CEO turnover. I investigate whether overconfident managers are less likely to engage in an earn-
ings big bath after their appointment. In my empirical analyses, I find fewer big baths in firms with
a new overconfident CEO than in firms with a new non-overconfident CEO. The findings are
robust to alternative overconfidence classifications, big bath definitions, the endogenous choice
of hiring an overconfident CEO, and to several alternative explanations of accounting behaviour
at the turnover event, such as the turnover type (routine vs. non-routine), managerial compen-
sation and corporate governance mechanisms. Ahmed and Duellman (2013) find that overconfi-
dent managers are generally less conservative in their accounting policies. I add to their paper by
showing their results could partly be driven by big baths at CEO turnover.
The findings of the paper widen our understanding of how managerial traits, in particular
overconfidence, affect accounting outcomes. My findings are relevant for investors assessing
the financial situation around CEO turnover and for firms hiring a new CEO to understand the
influence of managerial traits on financial reporting. In particular, investors should be aware
that earnings are overstated when overconfident managers fail to report write-offs.
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